Even though Dr. Riddick's tenure as Senate Parliamentarian coincided with some of the most difficult and passionate issues ever encountered by the Senate, such as Vietnam and civil rights, he was ever the calm professional, always willing and ready to lift a hand, always desirous of helping especially the new Members who were sworn into this body, always there, too, at the beck and call of the Members who had been here a long time.

Such a common, friendly, warm, congenial, accommodating, decent individual! Around him there seemed to be always an aura of peace and control. He kept his mind on his responsibilities, and he never ever forgot that, as Parliamentarian—in effect, the silent referee of Senate debate and procedure—he had to maintain complete and total objectivity. No partisanship—complete and total objectivity.

Senators on both sides of the aisle knew it. They knew when they went to him, they would get the straight answer and it would not be colored or tinctured by partisanship. Doc Riddick was in every sense of the word a scholar. He was quiet, soft spoken, unassuming, and absolutely rock solid. That was Floyd Riddick!

I leaned upon him heavily in my earlier years in the Senate. He was a delight to work with, and I enjoyed his company. He was one of those completely dedicated selfless people who labored for the good of the institution. He loved the institution. He labored for the good of the Senate and for the good of his country.

Robert E. Lee said that the word ''duty'' was the sublimest word in the English language. Dr. Riddick understood what that meant, and, to him, duty was sublime. He was above politics, as I have repeatedly said, he was honorable, and he was entirely above reproach.

Floyd Riddick did not need praise, although he certainly deserved it. He did not covet recognition, although the recognition of his scholarly expertise was widespread. For him, the glory of the work, the glory of serving the Senate, the glory of serving Senators, and through Senators the glory of serving the American people, was enough.

We will long remember Dr. Riddick, those of us who served with him. Whence cometh such another?

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senator from Virginia may proceed as in morning business for such time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to address my colleagues on both sides of the aisle with regard to the deepening and very grave concerns I have in my heart about the situation in both Bosnia and Kosovo. I, as many colleagues, travel with some regularity to that region of the world, the Balkans. Just 3 weeks ago, I completed my most recent trip. I had the distinct privilege of being accompanied on that trip by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Clark, Commander in Chief of NATO Forces, in my travels through Kosovo, and then later the next day with his deputy, Admiral Abbott, as I went into Bosnia.

I have been to this region many times, although I am not suggesting I am any more of an expert than my colleagues. I first went in 1990 with then-leader Robert Dole. We went to Pristina, in Kosovo. I remember our delegation of Senators queried Senator Dole: Why here? Bob Dole instinctively knew that Kosovo could become a battleground. I remember Stephen Ambrose, the historian, was alleged to have quoted Eisenhower when Eisenhower was asked, 10 years after D-day: General, tell us about the next war. And Ike very wisely did not opine, except to say: That war could come as a surprise and may well come from a direction that none of us could anticipate.

In our visit to Kosovo, I and that tried and tested and courageous Bob Dole, a soldier of World War II, were confronted with a totally unpredicted situation while in Pristina. Thousands and thousands of people heard about Members of the U.S. Congress coming to this remote region, and they converged on the hotel. There was panic in the streets and a great deal of disorder. People were being trampled in the crowds, and Senator Dole had to make a wise decision, and a quick one, that we had to exit because we could be responsible for injuries to people, people who wanted to come to see us, people who wanted to tell us about the hardships that were then being inflicted by Milosevic. Indeed, we made a hasty retreat.

But as we went back to our plane, we passed that historic piece of ground, whose origin goes way back, in my recollection, to the 1300s, that field of battle which actually the persons who preceded the governing structure today lost. They lost the war, yet they still consider that hallowed ground. But I remember as we passed that battlefield, Bob Dole said: Tragedy and fighting will visit this land someday.

And that it did. Our Nation's men and women of the Armed Forces, primarily the Air Force, fought a courageous battle: 78 days of combat, tens of thousands of missions together with other nations—seven other nations were flying missions with our Air Force—and eventually the major nations of the world came to an understanding as to how that fighting should stop. It was causing tremendous damage, but there was no other recourse by which we could get the attention of Milosevic.

There are those who say today, in hindsight, perhaps we should not have done this, perhaps we should not have blown up that bridge. When I visited Pristina several weeks ago, someone said: We haven't got power because the power lines were blown out. It was a tough war, and our military commanders made tough decisions; 19 nations got together to make those decisions—a historic first combat by NATO. They made it work. Now they have basically stopped any major fighting and we are down to incidents —fortunately few incidents, but nevertheless dangerous ones.

When I looked into the faces of the young men and women of our Armed Forces, and indeed other armed forces, and actually walked the streets with a patrol, it was clear they were performing duties for which they were never trained in their military careers. Historically, our troops have not in any great measure performed the type of mission they are doing in that region. But they are doing it and doing it very well. They are accepting the risks of getting caught in the crossfire that still erupts as a consequence of the cultural differences, the ethnic hatreds. Indeed, much of the fighting today in Kosovo is Albanian upon Albanian. It is retribution against fellow Albanians because they at one time or another did something to further the Serb interest.

Our troops are there. When you ask those in charge, whether it is the NATO commanders, the U.N. representative, the E.U. representative, or anyone else, no one can give you any time estimate within which our forces can be withdrawn. The infrastructure that was to move in behind in Kosovo, the commitments that were made by a number of nations to provide police, to provide money to pay salaries for the judicial element, to help rebuild the power lines—it is not flowing. It is caught up in bureaucracies, international bureaucracies. It is all but stagnant—all but stagnant.

I met with the commander of all troops, a very competent professional German officer. I met Ambassador Kouchner, who has been designated to pull together the various elements to make this work. We were in a room in the military headquarters. There was no running water. The water pipes were shut off, partially due to freezing and partially due to lack of power. The light bulbs flickered. Ambassador Kouchner pointed out we do not have enough power to keep the homes warm. There was a certain feeling we won the war but we could lose the peace, because the war goes on amongst the bureaucracies, no matter what the good intentions may be to bring forth and reestablish in that war-torn region of Serbia—Kosovo is a part of Serbia—the

infrastructure needed to bring back just a modicum of a normal life.

Foremost in my heart is my deep concern for the men and women of the armed services undertaking missions for which they were not trained. Missions which take them away not only from their families, but take them away from other potential deployments of our U.S. military, a military that is stretched far too thin already.

These men and women of our military need to have some definitization of how much longer we are going to keep significant numbers deployed to Kosovo. That timing is directly tied to the ability and the willingness of other nations and organizations to come in and consolidate the military gains, reestablish an infrastructure—be it judicial, be it police, be it rebuilding, be it a form of government, be it elections—so that the troops can return—ours and others—to their assignments and their bases elsewhere.

A similar situation still exists in Bosnia after these many years. However, let me draw a distinction. After the fighting stopped in Bosnia, the military decided they would locate the troops in heavily protected compounds. They would go out on daily patrols to prevent the eruption of further fighting. So far, that has worked.

Clearly, without any question, the military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are a great credit to the men and women who fought them, the men and women who planned them, and the men and women who are still there today. That job was done and done well.

In Kosovo, they decided not to concentrate the military, either the U.S. military, or the other militaries. Rather, they were dispersed in the various regions. The U.S. region is the same as the one controlled by the British and the French. They dispersed them right out into the small communities so that men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces, four and five of them at a time, are living in some war-torn house or in a small churchyard where I saw them. Some are just guarding churches because of the incredible desire to destroy churches. That is a whole chapter of this tragedy which someone has to examine. The Albanian forces practically destroyed every church the Serbian people ever used.

Quite different is the military deployment in Kosovo from that in Bosnia, but both have worked. Both were carefully planned, both have a credible measure of success.

In Bosnia, the Dayton accords laid the blueprint. One can argue we should have done this and we should have done that in Dayton. Yes, we knew it could have been better, but we had to get an agreement, and we got the best we could at that time.

One of my concerns is we should go back—not reconvene everybody who was at Dayton—but go back and examine what was right and what proved not to be successful at Dayton and correct it.

The fighting has stopped, and the military provides a security blanket within which the various factions can begin to reestablish that country. Some progress is being made, but by any timetable, that progress is way behind the expectations, given the fighting has been over for several years. It is way behind, again, because of the difficulty of the bureaucracies working to bring in adequate police, and not just the police who perform duties on the streets, but in the case of Bosnia, we need an international police force to investigate and fight the rampant crime.

Beneath the security blanket provided by the men and women of the Armed Forces, organized crime is rampant. It has been said the only thing really organized in Bosnia is organized crime. The various ethnic factions get along very well in the criminal underworld. They have charted their ground.

Yes, things are slowly improving in Bosnia but ever so slowly. There we have independent entities. The U.N. has one area of responsibility, primarily the police; the E.U. another area of responsibility; the OSCE responsibility with regards to elections. However, they each report to different capitals.

I had the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations in my office yesterday. He is in charge of peacekeeping all over the world. He made clear how the four basic entities in charge of bringing about the restoration of Bosnia all have different reporting channels. There is no central authority that works today for the greater betterment of that region.

What has happened? You still cannot get a definitive date from anybody as to when the American troops and other troops can be withdrawn.

I say it is time the Congress of the United States should step up. We are a coequal branch of our Government. This body has time and time been called upon to vote for funds, for resolutions, and other legislative initiatives with regard to the Balkan situation. Now it is time for us to take a look at the constant flow of the American taxpayers' money and say: Is America going to keep its spigot flowing when, at the same time, other nations are not meeting their financial commitments or obligations?

If I can digress for a moment, I have studied this situation, I have talked with innumerable people, I have traveled to this region. The Balkan situation is the most difficult problem and a matrix of diversified responsibility and commitment I have ever tried to get my arms around. As soon as I feel I have one body of fact on which I can rely and reach a decision, another person will come along and say: No, it's different than that.

I have tried in this set of remarks to outline how I understand the situation to be in Bosnia and Kosovo. But I rise today to say to the Senate that it is my intention, when the piece of legislation we anticipate will be coming through soon, the supplemental—the supplemental has $2 billion—can I repeat that?—$2 billion associated with our obligations, military and otherwise, in just Kosovo. I think it is time we stated our intention as the Congress of the United States to allow the first part of those funds to flow—I will refine the language eventually—but to have a stopping point when we take a pause and we say to our President respectfully: Mr. President, no further funds of the $2 billion will flow until you can come back and give us some type of assurance, certification, or otherwise, that the other nations are living up to their commitments. That should get the attention of the other nations. I say most respectfully, that should give our President some leverage to deal with these other nations.

I am not alone on this. I have talked to a number of colleagues. As I say, my language is not refined at this point. I welcome suggestions. I welcome those who can contribute facts where I may be in error with regard to some of the statements I make today. In good conscience, I tried to check out everything. But, as I say, getting your arms around this problem is not easy. Getting the body of facts is difficult. Indeed, others have worked as hard as I have.

Collectively, let us bring together our judgments as to how best and by what mechanism we can assert our responsibility under the Constitution—as the coequal branch, as those who control the purse strings of the U.S. Government—to string this purse of $2 billion such that our President can expend what has to be expended in the next 90 days, following adoption by the Congress, but that there comes a time when accountability steps in.

Our President has to explain to the Congress what he has done, what remains to be done, and hopefully some prospects of when these situations in both Bosnia and Kosovo can be brought to a state of affairs where the infrastructure allows the significant withdrawal of our troops and, indeed, troops of other nations.

It may well be that the United States—we took a major role in the war in Kosovo, a major role in the war in Bosnia—could turn over such balance of troop responsibilities as may remain in, say, a year, 18 months, to the Europeans. They are quite anxious, under NATO, to establish their own organization militarily to do certain things in the event NATO, for one reason or another, decides not to do them. This might be their first challenge.

I see on the floor the distinguished leader of our NATO group in the Senate, the Senator from Delaware. We just met with the British Foreign Secretary on this very question. This might be an opportunity to test that new military structure. I have concerns about that and how it might have long-term effects on the weakening of

NATO, but for the moment I give those who propose it the benefit of the doubt. It has not been completely refined yet, this concept, nor implemented. So that is another question for another day.

The reason for my addressing the Senate today is my deep concern for the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States who are going through a winter far more severe than anything we have experienced here, certainly in the area of the Nation's Capital. And every day they could be subject to someone looking down a gun barrel, perhaps not firing in anger at them or the troops of other nations but firing in anger at someone else because of the persistent ethnic hatred that remains.

I say most respectfully, we have a duty in this institution to assert ourselves as to the timetable committed to by other nations with regard to their support in both Bosnia and Kosovo which, up to this point, has not been met. We should do everything within our power, and working with our President, to see that that is done.

Mr. President, simply put, the United Nations, the European Union, and the OSCE are not doing the job they committed to do—in a timely manner—in Bosnia or Kosovo. The successful NATO-led military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo were undertaken—at personal risk to our troops, and those of other nations, and with billions of dollars in cost to the American taxpayer—with the express understanding here in America that the UN and others would promptly move in behind and consolidate the gains. Now, as a result of little consolidation, U.S. troops—and troops from over 30 other nations—remain in Bosnia over four years after the end of that war, and are facing indefinite deployments to both Bosnia and Kosovo.

Personal bravery and international bonds of commitment won the wars in the Balkans; but, will the slow pace of follow-on actions result in a loss of peace?

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 2, when NATO commander General Clark was the witness, I first signaled my intention to take legislative action, in connection with the upcoming Kosovo Supplemental to be proposed by President Clinton, to revitalize the near stagnant situations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. I addressed this subject again this past Tuesday, during the Committee's annual hearing with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the budget request.

I am considering a variety of options, including tying U.S. military funding for these operations to demonstrable progress by the UN, the EU, and the OSCE in fulfilling their commitments to rebuild the civil society in Bosnia and Kosovo; or requiring the withdrawal of U.S. troops by a time certain—perhaps in 18 months—and leaving the military occupation in Bosnia and Kosovo to European leadership. In the coming days, I intend to continue to consult with my colleagues in the Senate, and others in the Administration and outside of government, on this initiative. From my initial discussion with my colleagues I have to say, support is growing for my concept.

Congress has a co-equal responsibility with the Administration, and we now must exercise leadership, hopefully with concurrence by the Administration. This situation just cannot continue. Other nations and organizations will have to follow through on their commitments, the parties in the region will have to start cooperating with international authorities and taking on more responsibility for the fate of their region and their people.

The U.S. military will not stay there forever. The United States has far too many commitments around the world, our military is stretched too thin as it is; we cannot have a decades-long military deployment to the Balkans.

We, together with other nations, went into Bosnia and Kosovo with the best of intentions—to stop the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people, to restore peace and stability to the region, and to help the people of the Balkans rebuild lives shattered by war and ethnic cleansing. But what has the coalition achieved? Our military forces have done their job. We have stopped the fighting, but precious little other progress has taken place. As one official said to me in Bosnia, ''We have stopped the fighting, but the war goes on.'' Four years after the Dayton Accords ended the war in Bosnia, little progress has been made in rebuilding that country. The economy is stagnant, police forces are inadequate and ineffective even to deal with routine criminal activity—much less the growing problems of organized crime, the judicial system is far from ready, only crime and corruption are growing. In fact, I was told by a senior UN official in Bosnia that the only truly organized, multi-ethnic institution in Bosnia is organized crime. Regrettably, a similar situation is rapidly developing in Kosovo.

At this point, I would like to mention a positive event that has occurred in the region, the recent elections in Croatia. However, at this point, it remains to be seen if those elections will translate into similar positive events in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Since the timing of the departure of U.S. and allied troops from both Bosnia and Kosovo is directly linked to the progress—or lack of progress—that the UN and others make in achieving their goals, I am gravely concerned with the current situation. Clearly, the military has fulfilled its mission—namely, to provide a secure situation in Bosnia and Kosovo. In sharp contrast, the UN, the EU, the OSCE and others are not living up—in a timely manner—to the commitments they made to consolidate the gains made by the military.

Even though I have had a long association with the situation in the Balkans—having traveled regularly to the region since first visiting Kosovo in September 1990 with then-Senate Majority Leaders Bob Dole and others, and being the first U.S. Senator to go to Sarajevo during the war, in September 1992—I was, quite frankly, distressed by what I saw during my last visit in January.

Let me be clear—our troops, along with the troops from over 30 other nations that have joined the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, performed magnificently in their military missions. They are, today, conducting a wide variety of assignments, and doing an outstanding job. The U.S. troops I met in Bosnia and Kosovo are among the finest I have encountered in my 30-plus years of public service in working with military organizations throughout the world. They are well-trained, motivated and enthusiastic about what they are doing to help the people of Bosnia and Kosovo. Simply put—they have achieved their mission. To the extent possible, given the continued ethnic animosities, the military has stopped the large-scale fighting and has created a safe and secure environment, from a military perspective, in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, unacceptable, dangerous levels of criminal activity continue, and put our troops at constant risk.

So, why are our troops still in Bosnia over four years after they were first deployed? Why is there no end in sight in Kosovo? The reason is that the United Nations, the EU and other international organizations charged with the responsibility of rebuilding the civilian structures in Bosnia and Kosovo are simply not doing their job. This situation has to change.

Yesterday, I had the opportunity to communicate this message directly to Bernard Miyet, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations. We had a lengthy discussion regarding Bosnia and Kosovo and I conveyed to him my extreme concern with the situation there, in particular the slow pace with which the United Nations, European Union and other international organizations are fulfilling their promised assistance to the region.

Foreign donors must deliver, immediately, on their promises of international police so that NATO soldiers can get out of the business of policing. Our troops are not trained to perform these tasks, and it should not be part of their mission. The United States has made a major contribution of 450 police for Kosovo and is about to increase its commitment. Others, particularly the Europeans, have to do their share by providing the necessary police forces.

Secretary Cohen delivered that message to our European allies this past weekend, at the annual Wehrkunde Conference. According to Secretary Cohen,

> To date there has been a clear failure by participating nations to provide the UN with

sufficient numbers of police for public security duties in Kosovo, with a significant disparity in the amount of support provided by different Alliance members. Indeed, the number of police deployed is roughly half of what was planned. As a result, KFOR soldiers, who are trained to fight wars, are working as policemen, a job for which they have not been trained and should not be asked to perform indefinitely.

I agree.

We must be mindful of the fact that the United Nations and other international organizations can only succeed if the nations comprising these organizations contribute the needed resources.

In Kosovo, the UN needs the money to do the job. Only a small portion of the money pledged at last November's donors conference for Kosovo's budget has actually been delivered. This is the money that pays the salaries for teachers, judges, and street sweepers—the people who make Kosovo work and whose loyalty the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) needs if it is to succeed. The Europeans and others have to carry their weight and deliver on their commitments.

I am particularly concerned with the performance thus far of the European Union. The EU has taken on the primary responsibility for the reconstruction of Kosovo. This is a job to which the EU committed—in recognition of the fact that the United States bore the lion's share of the cost of the war. Unfortunately, it is not quite working out as planned.

Last fall, the EU committed almost $500 million for reconstruction. Recently, the European Parliament reduced that commitment to less than $200 million, questioning Kosovo's ''absorption capacity.'' It now appears that there is a serious chance that even this reduced EU commitment will not arrive in time to make a difference.

I would like to quote from the excellent statement made by the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator LEVIN, during last week's Committee hearing with General Clark:

> It is vitally important for the international community and particularly the nations of Europe to provide the funding and the civilian police that are so necessary if these missions (in Bosnia and Kosovo) are to be successful . . . The European Union can talk about a goal of greater Euoprean military strength—a stronger European pillar within NATO. But the first test is whether it will meet the responsibilities they have already accepted of providing $36 million and civilian police for Kosovo. On my scorecard, they are flunking the test.

The distinguished Ranking Member and I agree.

And again, during last Tuesday's hearing, Senator LEVIN reiterated and strengthen his message from last week by saying, ''There is a requirement (in Kosovo) for 6,000 civilian police, but less than 2,000 have been provided. We have provided our share but others have failed, and that failure endangers our troops and the success of our mission. Civil implementation of the cease fire is in real jeopardy and will fail unless a sufficient number of international civil police are put on the ground promptly by the Europeans. The European Union can talk all it wants to about its plans to provide a militarily strong European pillar within NATO under the European Security and Defense Identity. But that is just rhetoric. The reality is their failure to meet their current commitments in Kosovo.''

Since NATO troops were first deployed to Bosnia in December of 1995, the United States has spent almost $10 billion dollars to support our military commitment of troops to that nation. We have spent an additional $5 billion in Kosovo for the air campaign and the deployment of U.S. KFOR troops. The annual price-tag for these military commitments is $1.5 billion for Bosnia and $2 billion projected for Kosovo. This is an obligation for the American taxpayer.

In addition to these significant sums of money, I am concerned about the safety and welfare of the men and women of our Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces of the other nations, who every day patrol the towns and villages of Bosnia and Kosovo, subjecting themselves to substantial personal risk while performing duties traditionally not performed by military personnel.

As I said earlier, our troops have performed their mission—they have created a safe and secure environment, as I previously indicated. But the UN and other elements of the international community have not filled in behind our troops to perform their mission. The results is that our troops are forced to fill the vacuum, preforming missions for which they were not trained—acting as mayors, policemen, arbiters of disputes, large and small. I was told of U.S. troops who were guarding two old Serb women who did not want to leave their home, which happened to be in an Albanian village. I saw three U.S. soldiers guarding a Serb church in an Albanian section of Kosovo. We must ask ourselves, are these jobs our troops should be performing today, tomorrow or for an indefinite period, as is now projected? These are commendable, humanitarian objectives which should be assumed by entities other than the Armed Forces.

In Kosovo—as is the case in Bosnia—there is a level of hatred—personal, ethnic and religious—that is simply beyond our comprehension. When I was in Kosovo in January, I was told that most of the violence in Kosovo is now Albanian on Albanian violence. I find this troubling. The United States and our NATO allies went into this region for the purpose of stopping and reversing the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs. But what has been a consequence of our involvement? While hundreds of thousands of Albanians have returned to their homes, tens of thousands of Serbs have been driven from Kosovo—the result of attacks by returning Albanians. Now that the Serb population of Kosovo—such as it is—has been isolated in small pockets of the province, we are seeing growing violence by Albanians against fellow Albanians, simply for their past or present association with Serbs. In the town of Vitina, I was shown a store, owned by an Albanian, which had been bombed 2 days before our arrival. Why? The Albanian shopkeeper had purchased property from a Serb—he was a ''collaborator'' in the minds of hardline Albanians.

Is it realistic for us to think that these people can ever live together peacefully? Or are we wasting our time and money—and needlessly risking the lives of our people—trying to achieve the goal of a multiethnic society for Bosnia and Kosovo?

I believe that we have reached that point in time when it is the responsibility of the Congress to take action—to reexamine the goals, their achievability, and what appears to be our open-ended involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo for an undetermined period of time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER: The Senator from Delaware.

(The remarks of Mr. ROTH pertaining to the submission of S. Con. Res. 81 are located in today's RECORD under ''Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

BLOCK GRANTS IN EDUCATION

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong opposition to the use of block grants in education spending.

First, education is clearly the No. 1 issue this body, our Government, and our country will face in the next decade. We have huge educational problems. We are now an ideas economy. Alan Greenspan put it best. He said: High value is no longer added by moving things but by thinking things, that it is an idea that produces value.

In that kind of time and place, what could be more important than education? In an ideas economy, for America to have a mediocre educational system, which is what we have now, is a very real crisis. If we continue to be rated 15th, 16th, 17th among the educational systems of the OECD Western countries, the 22 countries in North America, Asia, and Europe, we are not going to stay the greatest country in the world by the time 2025 or 2050 rolls around. Fortunately, because of our democratic system and our free enterprise system, because of the great entrepreneurial nature of America, because we accept ambitious and intelligent people from all over the world to come here and grow and prosper, we have a little lead time but not much.

Our educational system is at a critical point. Over the next decade, for instance, high school enrollment will increase by 11 percent. Schools will need